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Anthropomorphic beliefs about objects lead people to treat them as if they were alive. Two experiments test how anthropomorphic thought
affects consumers' product replacement intentions. Consumers induced to think about their car in anthropomorphic terms (i) were less willing to
replace it and (ii) gave less weight to its quality when making replacement decisions. Instead, they (iii) attended to (experimentally induced
connotations of) the car's “warmth,” a feature usually considered relevant in the interpersonal domain. While anthropomorphic beliefs about
brands are often seen as advantageous by marketers because they increase brand loyalty, similar beliefs about products may be less desirable.
© 2009 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Although most people know that cars and computers are
inanimate, at times they treat them as if they were alive. Most of
us at some point have argued (or pled) with a computer, felt
attached to a favorite sweater or expressed love for a new car.
Anthropomorphic objects are also commonly featured in
movies and books intended for both children (e.g., The Brave
Little Toaster, Disch, 1987) and adults (e.g., 2001: A Space
Odyssey, Kubrick, 1968). People are experts in representing,
predicting and interacting with both the physical and social
worlds. When thinking about objects and people, there are
important differences in the processing of information, both at a
neural level (Mitchell, Heatherton & Macrae, 2002; Yoon,
Gutchess, Feinberg & Polk, 2006) and in terms of self-report
and behavioral measures (e.g. Cosmides, 1989). Thus, whether
a target is categorized as living or not has downstream
consequences on what information comes to mind, what
information is deemed relevant and what predictions seem
plausible when thinking about the target.
We examine the consequences of anthropomorphism on the
kinds of information consumers' attend to when forming
product replacement intentions. Whereas objects are primarily
evaluated based on how well they function, functionality is far⁎ Corresponding author. Department of Psychology, University of Michigan,
530 Church Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1043, USA.
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doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2009.12.008less important when evaluating people—and we assume that the
same may hold for anthropomorphized objects. We predict, and
find, that priming anthropomorphic beliefs about a product
shifts attention away from pragmatic considerations (such as the
product's functionality) and makes consumers sensitive to
information that figures prominently in the interpersonal realm
(such as the product's perception as “warm” or “cold”).
Specifically, consumers (i) reported lower intentions to replace
their car when they were induced to think about it in
anthropomorphic terms. More importantly, (ii) thinking about
one's car in anthropomorphic terms decoupled replacement
intentions from the car's perceived quality and functionality
(Studies 1 and 2). Instead, (iii) consumers who were primed to
think about their car in anthropomorphic terms turned to
information that is valued in the interpersonal domain and were
less likely to replace their car when its color was associated with
(experimentally manipulated) “warm” rather than “cold”
connotations (Study 2). Next, we review relevant research and
develop our rationale in more detail.
Anthropomorphic thought
In principle, almost any object of thought can become
anthropomorphized, even invisible entities (e.g. ghosts; Bering,
2006) or purely symbolic concepts (e.g. brands; Aaker, 1997;
for a review see Guthrie, 1993). People are particularly likely toed by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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physical features, such as eyes (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Jipson
& Gelman, 2007), hands (Woodward, 1999) or a human-like
form (Aggarwal & McGill, 2007), or that behave in an
apparently complex or intentional manner (Heider & Simmel
1944; Epley, Waytz, Akalis & Cacioppo, 2008). In addition,
individual difference variables, like loneliness and desire for
social contact, are associated with a higher propensity to
anthropomorphize objects (Epley, Akalis, Waytz, & Cacioppo,
2008). Throughout, the findings are compatible with general
models of knowledge accessibility (Higgins, 1996) and suggest
that any variable that increases the temporary or chronic
accessibility of agentic beliefs is likely to foster anthropomor-
phic thought about objects (for a review of the causes of
anthropomorphic beliefs see Epley, Waytz & Cacioppo, 2007).
Once a product is anthropomorphized, it becomes possible
for consumers to enter into a relationship with it, changing the
emotional quality of consumers' experience with their posses-
sions. Social interaction is pleasurable, and imbuing a product
with anthropomorphic cues leads consumers to experience more
positive affect when interacting with it (Wang, Baker, Wagner
& Wakefield, 2007). Indeed, even in the absence of
anthropomorphic cues, some consumers spontaneously experi-
ence uniquely social emotions when interacting with objects,
including love (Schultz, Kleine & Kerman, 1989) and trust
(Aaker, Fournier & Brasel 2004). Over time, connections to
special products and objects can grow, leading consumers to
form a sense of attachment that parallels interpersonal
attachment patterns (Wallendorf & Arnould, 1988; Ball &
Tasaki, 1992; Bowlby, 1980). As a result, much like in
interpersonal relationships, consumers can come to depend on
objects, feeling a sense of security when they are close and
distress when they are absent (Thomson, MacInnis & Park,
2005). Some companies have experimented with capitalizing on
customers' feelings of loyalty to reduce business costs. For
example, Zipcar decided to name all of its rental vehicles and
reported that this led customers to be more diligent about
cleaning and maintaining them (Levine, 2009). In combination,
these observations suggest that consumers should be less
willing to replace a product they own when they think about it in
anthropomorphic terms.
In addition, anthropomorphizing a product should reduce the
usually observed link between perceived product quality and
replacement intentions. This prediction follows from the
observation that thought about the inanimate world is usually
dominated by instrumental considerations, whereas thought
about the social word is not. For example, perceived product
quality and performance are central to product evaluation and
these instrumental attributes usually trump more symbolic
attributes, such as brand image and brand personality (Zentes,
Morschett & Schramm-Klein, 2008). In a study of retail store
brands, Zentes and colleagues found that the effect of store
performance on attitudinal and behavioral measures of customer
loyalty far exceeded the effect of customers' perceptions of
brand personality. In contrast, people maintain interpersonal
bonds with relatively little regard for the instrumental
contributions offered by others (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto,2007; Jones & Vaughan, 1990). Instead, considerations of the
intentions behind actions (Falk, Fehr & Fischbacher, 2008),
communality and relational status often trump considerations of
instrumentality, like the actual contributions of the other's skills
and competence to one's own outcomes (Wojciszke, Bazinska
& Jaworski, 1998; for a recent review see Ybarra et al. 2008). In
a relational context, social features of identity are particularly
salient and people are more likely than not to behave in a
manner consistent with accessible features of identity (Oyser-
man, 2009). As a result, social relationships are maintained even
when they require costly sacrifices (Simmons, Marine &
Simmons, 1977) and people routinely invest resources in caring
for the old, the sick and the weak, even when they can no longer
serve a useful function (Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman,
1993; Levine & Moreland, 2002). By changing the perceptions
of a product, anthropomorphic cues may also make relational
aspects of the self salient, allowing the product to fulfill identity
based motives (e.g., Aaker & Akutsu, 2009; Shavitt, Torelli &
Wong, 2009).
When people think about objects in anthropomorphic terms,
they apply knowledge about the social world to the inanimate
world. This is reflected in categorization decisions (e.g., Jones,
Smith & Landau, 1991) and the use of social categories (like
gender or age) in the description of objects (e.g., Heider &
Simmel, 1944; Berry & Springer, 1993). Moreover, people
apply social schemas to objects and prefer objects that fit the
schema. This leads consumers to prefer product lines that match
social structures, such as “family,” and cars that smile rather
than frown (Aggarwal & McGill, 2007). Thus, “ownership”
may instead become a “relationship” and the features relevant to
relational partners may become applicable to anthropomor-
phized objects.
In combination, these considerations lead to the following
three predictions. When consumers think about a product in
anthropomorphic terms they are (i) less willing to replace it; (ii)
less likely to base replacement decisions on instrumental
attributes of the product, thus decoupling perceived product
quality and replacement intentions; and (iii) more likely to
consider attributes that are usually deemed important in the
interpersonal domain.
The present research
We test these predictions in two studies, using an
experimental strategy that differs from the two dominant
strategies employed in anthropomorphism research. One
common strategy is essentially correlational and relies on
observed parallels between social cognition and object
cognition as evidence of anthropomorphic thought (e.g.,
Aggarwal, 2004; Berry & Springer, 1993; Heider & Simmel,
1944; Schultz et al., 1989; Thomson, MacInnis & Park, 2005;
Wallendorf & Arnould, 1988; Ball & Tasaki, 1992). A second
common strategy endows objects with human features to elicit
anthropomorphic beliefs, e.g., by having the object talk, smile,
frown, and so on (e.g., Aggarwal & McGill, 2007; Epley et al.,
2008; Jones et al., 1991). Although both approaches have
demonstrated anthropomorphic thoughts about objects, skeptics
1 For both manipulation checks, we report the results of the coder who
reported the smallest difference between conditions.
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application of social knowledge to objects as opposed to the
influence of pragmatic linguistic or situational considerations.
From this perspective, parallels between how individuals
describe objects and people may reflect mere linguistic
convenience. Moreover, the presentation of novel objects with
human features may convey that the object is to be thought
about in human terms—or why else would it be endowed with
these features? Hence, the observation of apparent agentic
beliefs about an anthropomorphized object may, at least in part,
be the result of pragmatic inferences about the intentions of the
communicator (Schwarz, 1996).
The present studies address these ambiguities in two ways.
First, our dependent variable does not consist of object
descriptions that may invite the use “human” terms for reasons
of linguistic convenience. Instead, we assess product replace-
ment intentions as a decision to which social norms are
applicable. Second, we hold the object constant and manipulate,
through a preceding question, whether technical or “psycho-
logical” attributes of the object are likely to come to mind.
Following this manipulation, participants describe the product




Participants (N=92) completed the study online for partial
course credit. They were randomly assigned to one of three
conditions (Anthropomorphism, Object, and Control) and told
that the survey explored “what people think about their cars.”
Participants assigned to the Anthropomorphism condition first
rated their car on five bipolar scales anchored with personality
traits (reserved – enthusiastic, quarrelsome – sympathetic,
dependable – irresponsible, open to new experiences – un-
creative, and anxious – calm), whereas participants assigned to
the Object condition rated mechanical attributes of their car
(quiet – loud, unresponsive – responsive, unreliable – reli-
able, versatile – limited, shaky – smooth). Pilot testing revealed
that in a free association task, people spontaneously listed more
agentic nouns (people or other living entities) following
presentation of the Anthropomorphism adjectives than the
Object adjectives, F(1, 18)=45.33, pb .001, confirming that the
personality adjectives are more likely to bring anthropomorphic
concepts to mind. Participants assigned to the Control condition
completed neither of these scales. Subsequently, participants
described their car in their own words and rated the likelihood
that they would replace their car before they left college (1=not
at all, 7=very much so).
Results
Manipulation check
Participants' descriptions of their cars were coded for the
presence of anthropomorphic language by two independent
coders. Anthropomorphic language included mentioning thattheir vehicle had a name, use of animate pronouns (he/she),
elaboration of the vehicle's “personality” using agentic trait
descriptions beyond those provided in the rating scales, and the
use of interpersonal emotions (e.g. “love”) when describing
their attitude toward their car (Schultz et al., 1989). Agreement
between coders about the presence of anthropomorphic
language was high, κ=.88. A chi-square analysis revealed
that participants were more likely to describe their car in
anthropomorphic language in the Anthropomorphism condition
(48%) than in the Object (29%) or Control condition (15%),
χ2(2,90)=8.41, pb .02. This confirms that our manipulation
worked as intended.1
Participants' open ended descriptions of their cars were also
coded for valence by two coders blind to conditions and
hypotheses (α= .86); the coders' ratings were averaged to create
a composite measure of perceived car quality (−3=extremely
negative description; +3= extremely positive description).
Planned contrasts were computed to compare the anthropomor-
phism condition to the other two conditions and both ratings
scale conditions to the no-rating control condition; neither of
these contrasts showed a difference in overall valence of
participants' descriptions of their car, Fsb1.
Hypotheses tests
Next we turn to participants' willingness to replace their car.
A planned contrast (Rosenthal, Rosnow & Rubin, 2000)
comparing the anthropomorphic condition to the other two
conditions confirmed that participants reported less intention to
replace their car after rating its personality characteristics
(Anthropomorphism condition, M=2.23, SD=1.54) than after
rating its technical characteristics (Object condition, M=3.14,
SD=2.24) or providing no attribute rating (Control condition,
M=3.15, SD=2.04), F(1,89)=4.52, pb .04, ηp
2 = .05. Follow-
up contrasts revealed that the anthropomorphic condition
differed from the object condition, F(1, 89)=3.21, pb .05,
one-tailed, as well as the control condition, F(1, 89)=3.55,
pb .05, one-tailed, whereas the latter two conditions did not,
Fb1.2.
To test whether this pattern implies the predicted dissociation
between perceived product quality and replacement intentions,
we analyzed the relationship between the valence of partici-
pants' open ended car descriptions and their replacement
intentions in the anthropomorphic and non-anthropomorphic
conditions using regression. Replacement intentions were
regressed on a contrast code comparing the anthropomorphic
condition to the object and control conditions (for a discussion
of planned contrasts in regression analyses, see Cohen, Cohen,
West & Aiken, 2003). Overall, participants reported higher
intentions to replace their car the more negatively they had
described it, β=−.50 t(87)=4.17, pb .001, as one would expect.
In addition, they reported lower intentions to replace their car
when they had thought about it in personality terms, β=−.21,
t(87)=2.21, pb .03, reflecting the findings discussed above.
More important, however, these main effects were qualified by
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β= .25, t(87)=2.10, pb .05, shown in Fig. 1. An examination of
the simple effects revealed that while poor quality reports were
associated with increased intention to replace in the Object and
Control conditions, β=−.45, t(58)=3.56, pb .001, intention to
replace was unrelated to quality in the Anthropomorphic
condition β=−.12, t(28) b1.
This pattern is also reflected in the correlations between
quality descriptions and replacement intentions. The more
positively participants described their car, the less willing they
were to replace it in the Object condition, r(22)=−.50, pb .02,
followed by the Control condition, r(26)=−.32, pb .10. In
contrast, the relationship between these variables was small and
not significant in the Anthropomorphism condition, r(24)=
−.15, pN .4, as observed in the regression.
Discussion
In sum, participants described their cars using more
anthropomorphic and interpersonal language when a preceding
question asked them to rate their car on personality traits rather
than technical characteristics, confirming the successful induc-
tion of anthropomorphic thoughts. While the anthropomor-
phism manipulation did not affect the valence of participants'
open ended descriptions of their cars, it did affect their
replacement intentions. As predicted, participants (i) reported
lower replacement intentions when they were induced to think
about their car in anthropomorphic terms. Moreover, (ii)
perceived product quality, as coded based on the valence of
participants' open ended descriptions, predicted replacement
intentions in the absence of anthropomorphic primes, but was
unrelated to replacement intention when anthropomorphic
beliefs were primed. These findings provide first evidence
that anthropomorphism can decouple product quality andFig. 1. The relationship between description valence and people's willingness to
replace it before they leave college. Participants in the Anthropomorphism
condition filled out a personality questionnaire for their car. Control conditions
either rated their car on non-anthropomorphic traits or did not rate their car.
Description valence was evaluated by coding participants' descriptions of their
cars. Low and high values are plotted one standard deviation below and above
the mean (Study 1).replacement intentions, consistent with the conjecture that
consumers may hesitate to replace anthropomorphized posses-
sions just because they get unreliable, much as they hesitate to
replace close friends just because they get old and cranky.
Nevertheless, two methodological concerns deserve atten-
tion; both pertain to unintended effects of our anthropomorphic
thought manipulation. First, the personality traits we used as
anthropomorphic primes may also have primed other positive
features of the product. These features may be unrelated to
anthropomorphic thought per se, but may result in more positive
evaluations and hence lower replacement intentions. Second,
rating the car on technical characteristics vs. personality
characteristics may not only have primed technical vs.
anthropomorphic concepts (as was intended), but the rated
attributes themselves may have differential evaluative implica-
tions. Both of these concerns imply that differences in
anthropomorphic thought may be confounded with a differen-
tial accessibility of valenced attributes of the car. Empirically,
the data provide no support for this conjecture. Any difference
in the accessibility of valenced attributes should be reflected in
participants' subsequent free-response descriptions of their cars;
yet these descriptions showed no difference in valence (Fb1).
Study two
Study 1 showed that consumers base their replacement
intentions on the perceived quality of the product in the absence
of anthropomorphic thought, but do not attend to product
quality once the product is anthropomorphized. This observa-
tion is consistent with the assumption that instrumental
considerations loom larger in the impersonal than in the
personal world. By the same token, however, features that are
valued in the interpersonal domain should be more likely to
affect product replacement intentions when consumers are
induced to think about the product in anthropomorphic terms
than when they are not. Study 2 tests this prediction by
manipulating participants' perception of whether their car's
color is “warm” or “cold,” a dimension that figures prominently
in perceptions of socio-moral traits and global evaluations of
positivity in interpersonal contexts (Asch, 1946; Ijzerman &
Semin, 2009; Williams & Bargh, 2008).
Method
Participants (N=127) completed the study online for partial
course credit; they were randomly assigned to the conditions of
a 2 (Color Labels: warm vs. cold)×3 (Primes: anthropomor-
phism, object and a no prime control)-factorial between-
participants design.
To manipulate the warm or cold connotations of the car,
participants were asked to select the color that most closely
resembled their own car's color from a matrix of nine colored
squares. The five most common car colors (accounting for 90%
of all new car sales; Dupont, 2006) were labeled with “warm”
(e.g., “summer blue”) or “cold” (e.g., “blizzard blue”) names.
All participants saw a mixture of “warm” and “cold” color
names along with four foil colors (e.g., “canary yellow”) and
Fig. 2. The relationship between description valence and people's willingness to
replace it before they leave college. Participants in the anthropomorphism
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alleged memory task. Note that this procedure ensured that all
participants were exposed to a mix of warm and cold color
names, thus avoiding the problem that some participants would
only be exposed to warm and others only to cold concepts;
instead, the conditions merely differ in whether the color of the
participant's own car is associated with a warm or cold label.
This procedure randomly assigned 58 participants to the Warm
and 64 participants to the Cold condition; 5 participants who
forgot the color name associated with their car were dropped
from analysis.2
Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of the
thought manipulations used in Study 1. Subsequently, they
described their car in their own words, indicated their desire to
replace their car before they left college (1=not at all; 7=very
much), and reported the name assigned to the color of their car
(thus completing the memory task).
Results
Manipulation check
Participants' descriptions of their cars were again coded for
the presence of anthropomorphic language by two independent
coders. Agreement between coders about the presence of
anthropomorphic language was high, κ=.86. A chi-square
analysis revealed that participants in the anthropomorphism
condition were more likely describe their car in anthropomor-
phic language (24%) than participants in either the object (7%)
or the control condition (6%), χ2(2,162)=10.82, pb .01. This
confirms that the manipulation worked as intended.
Participants' open ended descriptions of their cars were coded
for valence by two coders blind to conditions and hypotheses
(α=.89); the coders' ratings were averaged to create a composite
measure of perceived product quality (−3=extremely negative
description; +3=extremely positive description). Analyses of
this index of perceived product quality revealed no influence of
the experimental manipulations (all psN .3).
Hypotheses tests
Replicating Study 1, a planned contrast (Rosenthal et al.,
2000) comparing the Anthropomorphism condition to the other
two conditions confirmed that participants reported less
intention to replace their car after rating its personality
characteristics (Anthropomorphism condition, M=2.83,
SD=1.54) than after rating its technical characteristics (Object
condition, M=3.84, SD=2.24) or providing no attribute rating
(Control condition, M=3.82, SD=2.04), F(1, 118)=6.15,
pb .05, ηp
2 = .05. Follow-up contrasts revealed that the
Anthropomorphism condition differed from the Object condi-
tion, F(1, 118)=5.08, pb .05, as well as the Control condition,
F(1, 118)=4.15, pb .05, whereas the latter two conditions did
not differ from one another, Fb1.2 In addition, 31 respondents reported car colors outside the range of the 5
most common ones. Because the experimental manipulation of the color
connotations only covered the common colors, these respondents could not be
assigned to one of the experimental conditions.Next we turn to the influence of description valence and
temperature prime. Replacement intentions were regressed on
description valence, the warm/cold manipulation and a contrast
code comparing the Anthropomorphism condition with the
Object and Control conditions. Overall, participants who
described their car negatively were more willing to replace it,
β=−.47, t(115) = 4.84, pb .001. Moreover, participants
assigned to the Anthropomorphism condition reported lower
replacement intentions than participant assigned to the Object
or Control conditions, as reflected in a main effect of the
dummy variable representing the anthropomorphism condition,
β=−.22, t(115)=2.65, pb .01. However, these main effects
were qualified by two interactions. Replicating Study 1, an
interaction between the Anthropomorphism condition and
perceived product quality again indicates that anthropomorphic
thought dissociates replacement intentions from perceived
product quality, as shown in Fig. 2, β=.22, t(115)=2.34,
pb .03. As in Study 1, participants in the Control, r(34)=−.59,
pb .001, and Object condition, r(45)= .41, pb .001, reported
higher replacement intentions the more negatively they
described their cars, whereas the two variables were unrelated
in the Anthropomorphism condition, r(40)=−.07, ns.
Going beyond the replication of Study 1, an interaction of the
two experimental manipulations was also observed, β=−.21,
t(115)=2.12, pb .04 (Fig. 3). An examination of simple slopes
revealed that, as predicted, participants were particularly
unwilling to replace anthropomorphized cars when their color
had been associated with a warm (M=2.23, SD=1.77) rather
than cold (M=3.48, SD=2.10) color label, t(115)=1.90, pb .05,
one-tailed, for the simple effect. In contrast, color labels did not
influence participants' replacement willingness in the object
(Mwarm=4.00, SD=2.44 and Mcold =3.72, SD=1.86) and
control conditions (Mwarm=4.17, SD=2.14 and Mcold=3.44,
SD=2.22), tb1.condition filled out a personality questionnaire for their car. Control conditions
either rated their car on non-anthropomorphic traits or did not rate their car.
Description valence was evaluated by coding participants' descriptions of their
cars. Low and high values are plotted one standard deviation below and above
the mean (Study 2).
Fig. 3. The relationship between temperature prime and people's willingness to
replace it before they leave college. Participants in the anthropomorphism
condition filled out a personality questionnaire for their car. Control conditions
either rated their car on non-anthropomorphic traits or did not rate their car.
Warm and cold prime refers to the metaphorical connotations of a color label
applied to the subject's car (Study 2).
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Replicating Study 1, participants (i) reported a lower
willingness to replace their car when they had thought about
it in anthropomorphic terms and (ii) their replacement intention
was decoupled from their perception of the car's quality, as
measured by the valence of participant's descriptions of their
cars. Extending these findings, participants who had thought
about their car in anthropomorphic terms were (iii) particularly
unwilling to replace it when they were led to perceive its color
as “warm,” a highly valued trait in the interpersonal domain. In
contrast, warm/cold connotations of the car's color did not
affect the replacement intentions reported by participants in the
non-anthropomorphic thought conditions.
General discussion
Taken together, these findings show that attending to
“psychological” features of a product (i) leads consumers to
report lower replacement intentions (Studies 1–2) and (ii)
decouples replacement intentions from considerations of
product quality. Specifically, consumers' replacement inten-
tions depended on the perceived quality of the product when
anthropomorphic beliefs were not primed, but were independent
of perceived product quality when anthropomorphic beliefs
were primed (Studies 1–2). Conversely, thinking of “psycho-
logical” features of a product (iii) leads consumers to attend to
features that are valued in the interpersonal domain. Specifi-
cally, consumers who were induced to see their car's color as
“warm” reported lower replacement intentions than consumers
who were induced to see it as “cold,” but only under
anthropomorphic thought conditions (Study 2). In combination,
these findings suggest that anthropomorphic thought changes
the information that consumers attend to when thinking about
products while generally reducing replacement intentions.Finally, our results illustrate that anthropomorphic thoughts
about a product can be easily induced without adding
anthropomorphic features to the object itself.
Note that these findings cannot be explained by assuming
that our manipulation of anthropomorphic thought merely
increased participants' positive regard towards their cars. First,
we observed no difference in the positivity of participants' free-
response descriptions of their cars to begin with. Second, even if
observed, any increase in positive regard would merely predict
decreased replacement intentions. This prediction, however,
falls short of accounting for two other key findings: it provides
no rationale for the decoupling of replacement intentions and
perceived product quality and fails to predict the increased
impact of attributes valued in the interpersonal domain. In
contrast, the assumption that anthropomorphic thought grounds
object cognition in social cognition provides a parsimonious
account of all findings.
In the social realm, people are reluctant to replace close
others and our findings suggest that the same is true for
anthropomorphized possessions. Numerous variables—from
social norms to personal attachment and high regard for persons
and objects with which we form a unit relationship (Heider,
1958)—are likely to contribute to this hesitancy. More
importantly, in the social realm, information of instrumental
relevance, pertaining to the other's capability and performance,
must be balanced with other information such as communality
and intentions, both of which often matter more than (and do not
correlate perfectly with) actual outcomes (Falk, Fehr &
Fischbacher, 2008; Ybarra et al., 2008). Hence, instrumental
considerations are often of limited relevance in the decision to
maintain or terminate a social relationship. Our observation that
replacement intentions are decoupled from perceived car quality
suggests that the same applies to anthropomorphized posses-
sions. Conversely, information that bears on the other's
sociability and trustworthiness is of high relevance to
relationship decisions. Perceptions of the other as “cold” and
calculating or “warm” and trustworthy (Asch, 1946) figure
prominently in these considerations as a long stream of research
in person perception documents (for a recent review see
Williams & Bargh, 2008). Again, our findings suggest that the
same qualities figure prominently in decisions about anthropo-
morphized possessions. Future research may fruitfully explore
whether the observed differences are primarily driven by
connotations of warmth, coldness, or both. Finally, acting in
socially considerate ways is central to many people's identities
(Uchronski, 2008) and consumers readily use possessions to
affirm important identities and values (Shavitt et al., 2009). If
so, possessions may play a more prominent role in identity
based motivation (Oyserman, 2009) when they are anthropo-
morphized than when they are not; this possibility awaits further
research.
Implications
Anthropomorphizing products may have beneficial as well
as adverse consequences for both consumers and companies.
On the one hand, the increased attachment resulting from
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to invest more in maintaining it. If so, consumers may benefit
from an increased life span of their possessions and businesses
from the services and products required for proper maintenance.
On the other hand, anthropomorphizing a product reduces
consumers' willingness to replace it, as seen in the present
studies. This may potentially increase consumers' maintenance
cost beyond economically defensible levels while reducing
producers' sales. To date, we know little about these applied
implications, which provide a promising avenue for further
research. In contrast, anthropomorphizing brands (rather than
products) may be more clearly beneficial from a marketer's
perspective: whereas loyalty to a specific object interferes with
its replacement, loyalty to the brand encourages replacement of
the object with another exemplar from the brand.
Our findings further show that anthropomorphic cues can
direct attention away from some features and towards others.
This may allow marketers to increase the likelihood that
desirable features are attended to, while decreasing the attention
paid to undesirable features. But as previous research noted, this
strategy may come with consequences that are not always
obvious. Anthropomorphic cues may turn an otherwise
innocuous air intake grille into a welcoming smile or a
threatening scowl or may allow an idiosyncratic collection of
objects to become a family (Aggarwal & McGill, 2007). To the
extent that anthropomorphic perceptions elicit corresponding
relational expectations, consumers may also respond negatively
when the product does not live up to them. For example,
Aggarwal (2004) found that people dislike products that imply a
specific kind of interpersonal relationship style (e.g. a
communal or exchange orientation) once they realize that the
product does not live up to the norms associated with it.
Similarly, anthropomorphic primes may direct consumers'
attention away from the physical quality of a product and
towards other, less instrumental features, as observed in Study
2. This could hurt products of superior technical quality and
benefit competitors with more appealing “interpersonal”
features. In addition to changing perceptions of the product
itself, shifting attention to relational features of the product may
also change the effect of owning a product on a consumer's
sense of self (Belk, 1988; Kirmani, 2009). For example, to the
extent that communality is an important part of people's self-
concept, investing in the maintenance of anthropomorphized
products may make them feel better about themselves.
Finally, the observation that anthropomorphic thought is
easily elicited by asking for trait ratings raises a potentially
important methodological concern for market research surveys.
Stimulated by research into brand personality (Aaker, 1997),
many applied market research surveys assess consumers'
perceptions of a brand by asking for ratings that usually include
a mix of anthropomorphic (e.g. “honest”) and non-anthropo-
morphic (e.g. “rugged”) traits. Our findings suggest that the
anthropomorphic traits may foster anthropomorphized percep-
tions of the brand with downstream effects on intentions. If so,
collecting ratings of agentic traits may introduce a previously
unobserved source of systematic context effects in market
research (Weaver & Schwarz, 2008), potentially underminingthe predictive value of respondents' answers for consumers who
were not first induced to think in anthropomorphic terms. Future
research may fruitfully address this possibility.Acknowledgments
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